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The Idea of the World

BERNARDO KASTRUP
2019

Reality is fundamentally experiential. A universal phenomenal consciousness is the sole ontological primitive, whose patterns of excitation constitute existence. We are dissociated mental complexes of this universal consciousness, surrounded like islands by the ocean of its mentation.

What is wrong with the contemporary philosophical outlook
  • Mainstream physicalist ontology fails rather spectacularly to account for the qualities of experience and results now emerging from physics laboratories around the world.
  • The root of our contemporary philosophical ailment: the tendency to attempt to explain things by replacing concrete reality with abstractions. Conflating abstraction with empirical observation: The false mind-matter dichotomy.
  • Attempting to explain mind in terms of matter is epistemically more costly than attempting to explain matter in terms of mind. Perceptual constructs are primary over explanatory abstraction on both epistemic and ontic levels. We do not—and fundamentally cannot—know matter as confidently as we know mind. By incorrectly positing that idealism incurs epistemic cost comparable to that of mainstream physicalism in at least some important sense, the tacit conclusion undervalues idealism and overvalues physicalism.
  • Mind and matter do not form a dichotomy. Do not deny mind, because it is epistemically primary: all knowledge presupposes mind.
  • That the notion of physically objective matter—that is, matter outside and independent of mind—is now largely taken for granted suggests cultural acclimatization to what is in fact a mere hypothesis. After all, physically objective matter is not an observable fact, but a conceptual explanatory device abstracted from the patterns and regularities of observable facts—that is, an explanatory abstraction. Mind entails only the presence of phenomenal properties, in that it is defined as the substrate or ground of experience.
  • What we call ‘concreteness’ is itself a phenomenal property associated with the degree of clarity or vividness of experience, mind is the sole ground of concreteness. Anything allegedly non-mental cannot, by definition, be concrete, but is abstract instead, in the sense of lacking phenomenal properties.
  • Experience can be coherently regarded as an excitation of mind, whereas mind can be coherently regarded as the substrate or ground of experience.
  • By postulating a material world outside mind and obeying laws of physics, physicalism can accommodate the patterns and regularities of perceptual experience. But it fails to accommodate experience itself.
  • Pancomputationalism: posits that ungrounded information processing is what makes up the universe at its most fundamental level. Computation precedes matter ontologically. Mind is a derivative phenomenon of purely abstract information processing.
  • Information is given by state differences discernible in a system. As such, it is a property of a system. There is literally no sense in attributing ontological value to information. We do not know that abstract conceptual objects exist with the same level of confidence that we do know that our perceptions.
  • The anti-realist view in philosophy of science: abstract theoretical entities—such as subatomic particles and invisible fields, that escape our ability to directly perceive—are but “convenient fictions. The observable world behaves as if these abstract entities existed. This does not entail or imply that the entities actually exist.
  • By definition, the two members of a dichotomy are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Ontologically, this means that if one member is the case, then the other is necessarily not the case, and vice-versa. As such, a single test suffices to acquire knowledge about the ontological status of both members of a dichotomy. This property of a dichotomy is called Epistemic Symmetry. Epistemic symmetry can only hold for concepts residing in the same level of explanatory abstraction.
  • Every level of explanatory abstraction can encompass dichotomies. Mind and matter do not reside in the same level of explanatory abstraction. We have no reason to conclude that reducing matter to mind is as challenging as reducing mind to matter, and there is thus no substantiation for a ‘hard problem of mind.’
  • ‘Matter’ can be parsimoniously construed as phenomenal patterns of excitation of mind. Matter is on an epistemic par with mind and can in principle be reduced to the latter, for both already reside in the same ontological domain. This move takes mind itself to be an ontological primitive and eliminates any conceivable ‘hard problem of mind.’ Mind is the substrate of the explanatory abstraction we call matter, so when we speak of a mind-matter dichotomy we incur in a fundamental “category mistake.”
  • The ‘hard problem’ is not an empirical fact but the salient result of internal contradictions in a logico-conceptual schema.
  • Physicalism attempts to make sense of certain basic observable facts:
    • The correlations between observed brain activity and reported inner life;
    • The fact that we all seem to inhabit the same world; and
    • The fact that the dynamics of this world unfold independently of personal volition.
  • One of physicalism’s key tenets is that consciousness itself must be reducible to arrangements of objective physical elements. The qualities of experience are irreducible to the observable parameters of physical arrangements.
  • Microexperientialism posits that entities as small as subatomic particles are experiencing subjects in their own merit. The unitary subjectivity of more complex experiencing subjects, such as human beings, arises from bottom-up combination of countless simpler subjects. We cannot coherently explain how or why any physical action—such as bringing two subatomic particles close together or having them interact in some way—would cause the unification of their subjective points of view. This is known in contemporary philosophy as the ‘subject combination problem’. It is an artifact of thought.
  • Dual-Aspect Cosmopsychism posits that the cosmos as a whole is conscious. The associated cosmic consciousness being an irreducible aspect of reality, it circumvents both the ‘hard problem’ and the ‘combination problem.’ The thought artifact is the redundant and inflationary postulate that the cosmos as a whole is a “bearer of consciousness” as opposed to being constituted by consciousness.
An Idealist Ontology
  • The ontology of Idealism: all existence consists solely of ideas: thoughts, emotions, perceptions, intuitions, imagination.
  • Solipsism posits the world is your individual dream. The whole of existence unfolds in your individual psyche alone.
  • Idealism posits the whole universe is in mind, but not in your individual psyche alone. Mind extends far beyond the boundaries of personal introspection.
  • Existence consists of patterns of self-excitation of one universal mind. We and other living organisms are dissociated alters of this universal mind.
  • The inanimate universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of mentation in the segment of universal mind that is not comprised in any alter. We seem to inhabit the same shared world because we are all immersed in, and surrounded by, the ideas of mind-at-large.
  • Contextuality means that the properties of the physical world—e.g. the position and momentum of objects—do not exist independently of observation. The physical world we perceive isn’t merely discovered by observation, but created by it. What we call the ‘physical world’ arises from an interaction—an interference pattern—between the internal mental state of our alter and the external mental state of mind-at-large. An observation is this interaction across dissociated mental domains, which explains contextuality.
  • Four basic facts of reality, verifiable through observation, and therefore known to be valid irrespective of theory or metaphysics:
    • Fact 1: There are tight correlations between a person’s reported private experiences and the observed brain activity of the person.
    • Fact 2: We all seem to inhabit the same universe.
    • Fact 3: Reality normally unfolds according to patterns and regularities—that is, the laws of nature—independent of personal volition.
    • Fact 4: Macroscopic physical entities can be broken down into microscopic constituent segments, such as subatomic particles.
  • Unpacking Fact 1, we get more:
    • Fact 5: Irrespective of the ontological status of what we call ‘a person,’ there is that which experiences (TWE).
    • Fact 6: A person has private experiences that can only be known by others if the person reports them,
    • Fact 7: The brain activity of a person is known only insofar as its observation is experienced in the form of perceptions.
    • Fact 8: From Facts 1 and 7, there are tight correlations between two types of experience: (a) conscious perceptions of a person’s brain activity and (b) private experiences of the person. The intrinsic view is an entity’s conscious inner life, while the extrinsic appearance is how this conscious inner life is perceived by another entity.
    • Fact 9: A brain has the same essential nature—that is, it belongs to the same ontological class—as the rest of the universe.
  • The most parsimonious ontology is that which requires the smallest number of postulates whilst maintaining sufficient explanatory power to account for all facts.
  • Six inferences can be made:
    • Inference 1: underpinning Fact 5 is that TWE and experience are of the same essential nature. Experience is a pattern of excitation of TWE.
    • Inference 2: TWE is an ontological primitive, uncaused and irreducible.
    • Inference 3: TWE is associated with the entire universe. All activity in the physical universe is accompanied by conscious inner life at some level.
    • Inference 4: There is a sense in which living organisms are alters of unitary TWE.
    • Inference 5: Metabolizing organisms are the extrinsic appearance of alters of TWE. It is perceptions that carry extrinsic appearances, not thoughts.
    • Inference 6: The perceptions of an alter are reducible to the experiences of TWE that impinge on the alter from the outside.
  • Our perceptions do not feel like the thoughts of TWE because a qualitative transition between these two experiential categories has helped our ancestors survive and reproduce.
  • Markov Blanket is a boundary that defines the outline of an individual organism. Internal states of the organism will evolve to optimize for two conflicting goals: (a) to reflect external states of the world beyond the Markov Blanket; and (b) to minimize their own entropy or dispersion. In our case the Markov Blanket is the dissociative boundary of an alter, whose extrinsic appearance is our skin and other sense organs. Dissociation thus creates a Markov Blanket within TWE.
  • The qualities of perception experienced by an alter are compressed, coded representations of how surrounding thoughts of TWE actually feel. While there must be a correspondence between perception and surrounding thoughts, the respective experiential qualities don’t need to be the same.
  • We do not have personal volitional control over the laws of nature: the unfolding of the universe around ourselves consists of excitations of TWE from which we are dissociated.
  • Dissociation allows us to (a) grant that TWE is fundamentally unitary at a universal level and then still (b) coherently explain the private character of our personal experiences.
  • In order to report an experience to another or to oneself, one has to both (a) have the experience and (b) know that one has the experience, called a re-representation.
  • All mentation is actually conscious, even though we cannot report on much of it. It is true that there are phenomena that unfold outside self-reflective awareness, but this does not imply that there is anything outside consciousness itself.
  • For the same reason that thoughts disrupt emotions, ‘physical interference with the brain’ disrupts an organism’s inner experiences. The dynamics of universal consciousness outside its alters may unfold, at least partly, along lines that we may describe as instinctual or naturalistic.
  • If biology is the extrinsic appearance of alters of TWE, then the quest for artificial consciousness boils down to abiogenesis: the artificial creation of biology from inanimate matter. If this quest succeeds, the result will again be biology. There is no empirical reason to believe that a collection of flipping switches could ever be what individualized, private conscious inner life looks like from the outside.
  • Experiments have confirmed that—as predicted by quantum mechanics—reality is Contextual: its measurable physical properties do not exist before being observed. The relational interpretation regards every property of the physical world as relative to the observer. There are no absolute physical quantities, but simply a set of relational properties that comes into existence depending on the context of observation.
  • The relational interpretation relies on Shannon’s concept of information: “A complete description of the world is exhausted by the relevant information that systems have about each other.”
  • Shannon defines information as a measure of the number of states discernible in a system. As such, information is an abstraction associated with the possible configurations of a system, not a thing unto itself. The central idea of the relational interpretation is the notion that physics is fully relational, not just as far as the notions of rest and motion are considered, but with respect to all physical quantities.
  • When predicting microscopic quantum behavior, physicists are in fact predicting the perceivable output of instrumentation. Physics is entirely about what is perceived, directly or indirectly.
  • The intuition behind what we ordinarily regard as discrete physical systems entails (a) delineating a subset of the physical world on structural or functional grounds and (b) treating this subset as an entity in some sense separate from the rest of the physical world. If the delineation merely helps us structure our conceptual knowledge of the physical world, it is epistemic and—despite being convenient—arbitrary on an ontic level.
  • Living bodies are proper physical systems; they can be carved out of their context. Therefore, only the inanimate universe as a whole—that is, one universal von Neumann chain—and individual living bodies are proper physical systems; only the inanimate universe and living bodies are observers.
  • Since the ontic criterion for delineating bodies is the range of mentation associated with them, each proper physical system is associated with its own bounded mentation.
  • By definition, mental contents inside an alter cannot directly evoke mental contents outside the alter, and vice-versa. But they can still influence each other. Indeed, mental impingement across a dissociative boundary is empirically known.
  • Biology is what betrays elements of our world as extrinsic appearances of other alters. The inanimate universe is the extrinsic appearance of mind-at-large in relation to us. Only living beings and the inanimate universe as a whole constitute observers.
  • The Relational Interpretation:
    • entails that all physical quantities are created by observation
    • there is no absolute physical world, all physical quantities being relational
    • no physical system is privileged: all physical systems can observe and be observed.
    • quantum mechanics provides a complete and self-consistent scheme of description of the physical world.
  • The idealist ontology proposed is consistent with the relational interpretation and provides an ontological framework for its tenets.
  • The ontological framework proposed solves the following qualms:
    • The intuition of a shared world: even though we do not inhabit the same physical world, we do share a common nonphysical environment.
    • The ontological ground of information: mind is the sole ontological primitive and ground of all reality. Information is thus given by the discernible qualities of experience, which are themselves patterns of excitation of mind. Dissociation is a primary natural phenomenon.
    • Relationships without absolutes: there are no such things. All physical quantities are relationships between mental absolutes.
    • The meaning of ‘physical world’: the physical world corresponds to the compound state of the respective observer’s Markov Blanket.
    • The meaning of ‘physical system’: only mind-at-large and alters are physical systems.
Refuting objections
  • The idealist must accept that the knee-jerk resistance to his or her views is largely inevitable, given present cultural circumstances.
  • We are all immersed in myriad unexamined cultural assumptions and conventional patterns of thought.
  • Idealism is often considered implausible by analytic philosophers because of the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other arguments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited.
  • Wmpirical data shows that episodes of seeming unconsciousness are associated with an impairment of memory access, but not necessarily with absence of phenomenality.
  • Idealists acknowledge that there is a world outside and independent of their personal (dissociated) psyche.
  • Idealism is falsifiable.
  • Under idealism, biology is merely the extrinsic appearance of dissociated, local differentiations of consciousness, not the constituent or generator of consciousness. There was universal consciousness before such dissociated, local differentiations arose. And there was phenomenality in this universal consciousness corresponding to the inanimate universe prior to the origin of life.
  • The hypothesis offered here is not that the universe has human-like cognition and associated information integration.
  • The claim is simply that there is raw experience—qualia, pure and simple—associated with the universe as a whole, which does not require anything like the kind of information integration underlying human self-reflection.
  • The foundational theoretical inference of the clinical approach called Depth Psychology is that the human psyche comprises two main subdivisions: a conscious and an unconscious segment. The conscious segment comprises mental activity to which one has introspective access. In contrast, the unconscious segment comprises mental activity to which one has no introspective access. Inaccessible as it may be, depth psychologists contend that mental activity in the ‘unconscious’ still can and does influence one’s conscious thoughts, feelings and behaviors. Unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level function that conscious processes can perform.
  • Empirical evidence indicates that the unconscious is capable of cognitive control, the pursuit of goals, information broadcasting and even reasoning. Introspectively-inaccessible mental processes may still be conscious: they may be phenomenally experienced in a manner—or in a segment of the psyche—that escapes egoic introspection.
  • A rigorous definition well-accepted in neuropsychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind: mental activity is conscious if, and only if, there is something—anything—it is like to have such mental activity in and of itself. Mental activity corresponds to experience if, and only if, it is conscious.
  • The categorization proposed by Schooler distinguishes between “non-conscious (unexperienced), conscious (experienced), and meta-conscious (re-represented)” mental processes. Only the latter entails higher-order thought.
  • Re-representations are the product of a self-reflective configuration of consciousness, whereby the latter turns in upon itself so to objectify its own contents.
  • The emergence of so-called “no-report paradigms” in contemporary neuroscience attests to the abundant presence of waking experiences that are unreportable because they fall outside the field of self-reflection. The neural activity patterns of the NCCs themselves suggest circumstantially—yet compellingly—that many NCCs correspond merely to a self-reflective configuration of consciousness. Recent characterizations of the NCCs show precisely this pattern of reverberating back-and-forth communications between different brain regions.
  • The introspectively inaccessible character of experience that isn’t re-represented constitutes the first mechanism through which seemingly unconscious mental activity may, in fact, be conscious.
  • Dissociative states are well recognized in psychiatry today. Their hallmark is a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior. Dissociation entails fragmentation of the contents of consciousness. It appears that alters can not only be concurrently conscious, but that they can also vie for dominance with each other. The possibility that presents itself to us is that we may all have one or more conscious ‘others’ within ourselves, dissociated from our ego.
  • There may be no such a thing as an unconscious mental process. All mental processes may be conscious.
Neuroscientific evidence
  • Correlations between impaired brain function and enriched conscious inner life are, under idealism, entirely expected: if normal brain function is the extrinsic appearance of dissociated consciousness, then a reduction or impairment of normal brain function should be the extrinsic appearance of a reduction or impairment of the dissociation.
  • Reduction of dissociation can only be experienced as an enrichment of inner life: reintegrated memories, the recovery of a broader sense identity, renewed access to previously dissociated insights and emotions, reintegration of previously dissociated skills, etc.
  • The relative amount of mental contents encompassed by an alter does not bear relevance to how well dissociated these mental contents are from the rest of universal consciousness.
  • Brain function impairment will not disrupt the dissociation itself, but only stifle whatever is circumscribed by the dissociative boundary. The alter will become smaller, cognitively compromised, but still equally well dissociated. Many or even most types of brain function impairment should still come accompanied by cognitive deficit, not awareness expansion.
  • Only some specific types of brain function impairment, which somehow affect the dissociative mechanisms themselves—as opposed to the mental contents encompassed by the alter—should correlate with an enrichment of conscious inner life. Some of these include:
    • Fainting or near-fainting caused by restrictions of oxygen supply to the brain is known to induce liberating feelings of self-transcendence.
    • Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) are the prime examples of self-transcendence associated with dramatically reduced brain function due to e.g. cardiac arrest. They reportedly entail life-transforming phenomenality—encompassing insights, emotions and rich inner imagery—far surpassing the envelop of ordinary experiences despite overwhelming disruption to the brain’s ability to operate.
    • The use of transcranial magnetic stimulation can inhibit activity in localized areas of the brain by impairing the associated electromagnetic fields. As reported in a study, when neural activity in the angular gyrus of a patient with epilepsy was inhibited in this way, self-transcending out-of-body experiences were induced.
    • Experienced mediums displayed marked reduction of activity in key brain regions—such as the frontal lobes and hippocampus—when compared to regular, non-trance writing. Text written under trance scored consistently higher in a measure of complexity than material produced without trance.
    • Psychedelic substances have been known to induce powerful self-transcending experiences. Significant self-transcending experiences that follow psychedelic intake are—counterintuitively—accompanied by reductions of brain activity.
    • Some types of physical brain damage to also correlate with self-transcending experiences. Not only ‘mystical experiences’ correlate with brain damage, but also the emergence of new mental skills. The literature reports many cases of so-called ‘acquired savant syndrome,’ wherein an accident or disease leading to brain injury gives rise to genius-level abilities.
  • Under physicalism, an increase in the richness of experience does need to be accompanied by an increase in the metabolism associated with the NCCs, for experiences are supposedly constituted by the NCCs. This is a generic conclusion derived from first-principles informational considerations.
Related considerations
  • According to depth psychology, a neurosis is the expression of an inner psychic conflict caused by the ego’s refusal to acknowledge, confront and ultimately integrate unwanted affects rising from the unconscious. To keep these affects at bay, the ego uses a variety of defense mechanisms, among which denial, distortion, dissociation, repression and so on. A particularly common defense mechanism is projection whereby one circumvents the need to confront ego-threatening forces within oneself by ascribing the corresponding attributes to the outer environment.
  • The physicalist narrative provides a foundation for rationalizing the choice of living an unexamined, superficial life. By denying our felt sense of existence and identity, the physicalist narrative creates an opportunity to clear the ego of ultimate responsibility. By denying the fundamental reality of emotions, it creates an opportunity to protect the ego from a confrontation with far more powerful forces. And by projecting our ontological essence onto ephemeral arrangements of matter, it creates an opportunity to protect the ego from the experiential unknown of the after-death state.
  • It has been shown that religiosity can reflect a form of compensatory control. By believing that transcendent forces aligned with one’s convictions govern the world, the ego avoids the anxiety associated with its own inability to overcome uncertainty. Religiosity creates an opportunity for control by proxy: the physicalist narrative enables a sense of direct egoic control over nature.
  • If consciousness is just an epiphenomenon or emergent property of physical arrangements outside experience, it becomes conceivable that, through smart engineering, we could create means to upload our consciousness into more durable substrates such as silicon computers.
  • According to the Meaning Maintenance Model (MMM) of social psychology we can derive a sense of meaning from four different sources: self-esteem, closure, belonging, and symbolic immortality. In other words, we can find meaning in life through (a) cultivating a feeling of personal worth, (b) resolving doubts and ambiguities, (c) being part of something bigger and longer-lasting than ourselves, and (d) leaving something of significance behind—such as professional achievements—in the form of which we can ‘live on’ after physical death.
  • The key idea behind the MMM is that of fluid compensation as an ego-defense mechanism: If one of the four sources of meaning is threatened, an individual will tend to automatically compensate by seeking extra meaning from the other three sources.
  • I hypothesize that a profound and disturbing change in the intellectual elites’ understanding of the nature of their own being—that is, an ontological trauma—was the specific, forceful and personal trigger that helped congeal the physicalist narrative.
  • The physicalist narrative does not necessarily represent a net loss of meaning for the intellectual elites who produced and continue to promote it. The transcendent meaning lost along with religion may be compensated for by an increase in closure, self-esteem and symbolic immortality. Unfortunately, however, this compensatory strategy constitutes a significant threat to the sense of meaning of the average person on the streets.
  • The contemporary cultural mindset posits that things and phenomena only have semantic value insofar as we project this value onto them. As a result, our culture believes that the semantic value of the world is simply an artifact of human minds.
  • According to quantum theory, the outcome of an observation can depend on the way another, separate but simultaneous observation is performed. Correlations predicted by quantum theory cannot be accounted for by observation-independent hidden properties. Consequently, quantum theory appears to contradict non-contextuality and render physicalism untenable.
  • More recent experiments have again contradicted non-contextuality and confirmed that, unlike what one would expect if the world were separate or distinct from mind, the observed properties of the world indeed cannot be said to exist prior to being observed.
  • For all intents and purposes, the world we perceive is a product of observation.
  • The fact that archetypes extend into the world clearly indicates that the world itself is mental and continuous with our minds. Perceptual objects should be an expression of archetypal patterns in just the same way that thoughts are, so the world should be consistent—as it is—with our logic and mathematics. Some of the archetypically-defined normal modes of mind thus correspond to the laws of nature, which we discern as regularities on the screen of perception.
  • According to analytical psychology, our nightly dreams carry intrinsic semantic value because they are manifestations of deeply ingrained psychological archetypes seeking to express themselves. By interpreting the archetypal messages our dreams present to us in symbolic form we can, therefore, achieve meaningful insights that escape the reach of ordinary waking introspection. Now, if the world is akin to a collective dream also produced by mental archetypes, as discussed in the previous section, then the same rationale should apply to our waking lives. As such, the world is amenable to hermeneutics: it means something; it points to something beyond its face-value appearances; it evokes something a priori; it is not its own meaning.
  • Philosophical and spiritual traditions have been hinting at the intrinsic semantic value of the world for millennia. Our only access to God is through the images on the screen of perception that we call the world. These images are the extrinsic appearance of God’s conscious inner life. Beyond them, the only way to know God is to gain direct access to God’s inner life—that is, to be God.
  • Consciousness itself—not an object—is nature’s sole ontological primitive. In other words, literally everything can be reduced to the ultimate subject of experience, which isn’t anything you can point at. You cannot look at it, for it is that which does the looking. You cannot explain it, for it is that which does the explaining. It is, in fact, you; the real ‘you’ experiencing life through layers of dissociated mentation.
  • It is self-excitation that allows the structure and complexity of manifest nature to arise from the undifferentiated ground of universal consciousness. Physics, mathematics and logic are all archetypal expressions of the ultimate subject in the form of its natural modes of self-excitation.
  • Every theory of nature must postulate at least one ontological primitive possessing certain dynamical properties. The property of being self-excitable according to a variety of natural modes of vibration is a very popular one in physics, for good theoretical reasons.
  • Both space and time are qualities of experience. Time exists only insofar as what we call ‘past’ is an experiential quality characteristic of memory and ‘future’ an experiential quality characteristic of imagined possibilities or expectations. Space, in turn, exists only insofar as it is the experiential quality of a certain relationship between perceived objects. Spacetime is not an ontological primitive. I must presuppose a spacetime scaffolding at least metaphorically as a concession to the limitations of thought and language.
  • Significant aspects of our culture’s worldview are defined by intellectual elites—namely academia—and then disseminated throughout society by the mainstream media. Alternative and social media, whose advent initially promised to reduce our cultural dependency on the often-calcified views of academic elites, are now perhaps doing more harm than good: the fact-free, hysterical nonsense that often comes through these channels prevents them from garnering credibility.
  • An appropriate case for an ontology must be multi-disciplinary. To write this book I have had to venture not only into philosophy, but also psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, physics and even biology. In doing so, I am bound to have missed relevant literature or worded my arguments in a way that experts in the respective disciplines might consider inadequate, peculiar or even naïve. I hope this book succeeds in opening up new paths of inquiry around the twin notions of (a) spatially-unbound, self-excitable consciousness as sole ontological primitive; and (b) mental dissociation as a primary causal mechanism in nature.

These notes were taken from Bernardo's book.
See his website at www.bernardokastrup.com


RELATED NOTES

» The Idea of the World 2019
» More than Allegory 2016
» Brief Peeks Beyond 2015
» Why Materialism is Baloney 2014
» Meaning in Absurdity 2012
   Bernardo Kastrup


© 2020 Cedric Joyce